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Part 5

# ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
## UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 2, 1983

**Part 5**

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# ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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**WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1983**

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, D.C.*

## RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 11:12 a.m., in room SD–138, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Members present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Quayle, Nunn, Bingaman.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Patrick A. Tucker, counsel; Willis D. Smith, deputy staff director and chief scientist for the minority; George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Bruce D. Porter, and Carl M. Smith, professional staff members; Tamara L. Farnsworth, Jacquie S. O'Grady, and Toni D. White, staff assistants.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Frank Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; Arnold L. Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; James Steinberg, assistant to Senator Kennedy; and Ed McGaffigan, assistant to Senator Bingaman.

### OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning for the fifth of a series of hearings on the organization decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense.

This hearing will follow the four previous sessions, all of which proved to be extremely useful. At the first hearing on July 28 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger presented his views on the organization decisionmaking procedures of the Department.

The second hearing was held on September 20 with outside experts, Lieutenant General Krulak, Richard Steadman, and Phil Odeen.

On September 2, Elliott Richardson and Graham Claytor testified on the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The fourth hearing, held on October 4, focused on the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Witnesses were General Vessey, General Jones, and General Wilson.

This morning the committee is fortunate to have a most distinguished witness, Dr. James R. Schlesinger. Dr. Schlesinger has had extensive experience in national security affairs. He served as Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Strategic Analyst for the Rand Corp.

Is that correct, Dr. Schlesinger? I think you have held more jobs in government than George Bush. That must be something of a record.

On behalf of the committee, I welcome Dr. Schlesinger and express our sincere appreciation for the time he has taken to appear before the committee.

This morning's hearing was initially designed to focus on the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Schlesinger has, however, indicated a desire to speak to a wider range of issues including the need for structural changes in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I believe it will be most useful to hear Dr. Schlesinger, given his vast experience on those issues that are of concern to him. In this connection, I have provided Dr. Schlesinger for his consideration, a full range of issues that the committee currently plans to address in its overall inquiry.

Before I ask Dr. Schlesinger to proceed, let me yield to Senator Bingaman for any comments he might have.

Senator BINGAMAN. I really don't have any, Mr. Chairman. I am looking forward to Dr. Schlesinger's comments today.

Chairman TOWER. Dr. Schlesinger, we have your prepared statement. You may proceed to read it in full or, if you choose, you may offer it for the record and we will incorporate it in its entirety and you may proceed to summarize it and then we will go to questions.

## STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me start by saying that I applaud the committee's courage in taking on this particular issue. It is hoary, moss colored, and thorny. Your task is a formidable one.

I believe there are substantial benefits that can be obtained in the performance of this military establishment if we proceed to a circumspect reform of some of its institutions.

I do not want to exaggerate, Mr. Chairman. Structure is not a substitute for well-trained forces and capable leadership. It is not a substitute for all of those elements that make up a fighting force. But improved structure does release energies and imagination which under the present system I think have little latitude to express themselves.

Mr. Chairman, I comment on the historical origins of the present structure of the Department of Defense which emerged after World

War II and with a good deal of concern, expressed that we not create something like the German General Staff. That was a fallacious reading, I believe, of the recent history of the German General Staff.

It is true that the Ludendorff in World War I acquired dominance in Imperial Germany over the civilian politicians, but in World War II the German General Staff's role was at best meager in terms of political atrocities.

Moreover, the German General Staff did not cover the spectrum of forces. It dealt only with ground forces. It had little control over the Luftwaffe, which remained the pet of Herman Goering. It was not able to substantially influence naval strategy.

In the German case, I believe, Mr. Chairman, this had remarkably little relevance as Germany did not, in the same way as the United States today, require unified forces. It was fighting a continental war. The United States has not needed to fight here at home.

Grenada was a small exercise. Our forces are structured to operate to protect the margins of the free world around the periphery of the Soviet Union far from our shores, and for that reason unified forces reflected in the Unified Specified Commands are of a particular urgency to us in this era, more so in this era than in the period of massive retaliation. In the earlier periods the United States could rely on its superiority in nuclear forces to deter most major threats to its interests. Today that is no longer the case. We have come, essentially, into an era of rough equality. Perhaps we have advantages in some locales. The Soviets and their allies have advantages in other locales. But the main point to bear in mind is that, in this era, we would benefit substantially by an improvement in the efficacy with which we manage resources and forces within the Department of Defense.

Mr. Chairman, the central weakness of the existing system I fear lies in the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You have already had some testimony to this effect. Series of studies going back over the last three decades substantiate that testimony.

I do not wish to belabor this issue. Even less do I have any desire to criticize the performance of able men who are performing as well as they can within the constraints of the established system.

It is, indeed, somewhat unfair to criticize the structure which was established on the basis of one criterion, the preservation of latitude of the individual services on the basis of quite different criteria to obtain excellent advice, efficient war plans and well-designed force structures.

The existing structure of the JCS, if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable barrier to such advice. Suffice it to say that the recommendations in the plans of the Chiefs must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interest of each of the separate services.

The general rule is that no service ox may be gored. If, on rare occasions, disputes do break out that affect the interest of one or more of the services, the subsequent turmoil within the institution will be such as to make a repetition appear ill-advised.

The unavoidable outcome, Mr. Chairman, is a structure in which log-rolling, marriage agreements and the like flourish. I need not, I think, develop that point at any length up here on Capitol Hill. It will have a familiar ring to all of you.

The question that we must ask is whether a decisionmaking process designed to create a national consensus on political issues is the ideal one to replicate within the military establishment to deal with time-urgent military issues. I think the answer to that is probably no.

Mr. Chairman, I will skip over the budgetary issues. I think in a way they are subsidiary to our problem of obtaining efficient control of operations during crises.

I would suggest that the Nation proceed to practice with regard to its military forces what is taught in every military college in this country at the undergraduate or the graduate level. That is the need for unity of command.

Unity of command is flagrantly violated by the existing structure of the JCS. I, myself, while I have some hankering for the recommendations of General Meyer, would agree with Graham Claytor on the need for an evolutionary approach. Fix now only those things that really need fixing.

For that reason, I would support the more modest reforms suggested by General Jones, which are quite parallel to reforms recently instituted in the United Kingdom.

The Chairman, I think, should be the link to the Unified and Specified Commands. He should provide independent and crosscutting advice to the Secretary of Defense with full rights for the service chiefs to provide advice which is in contradiction of the Chairman.

The Joint Staff should be more responsive to the Chairman's unilateral requests. At the moment, the Chairman controls an office of five people. He cannot do the crosscutting that is necessary. He cannot effectively execute military operation. I would urge that the Chairman be provided with a four-star deputy.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to go into all of my own experiences within the Department of Defense. Suffice it to say that, in crisis situations, the Department was embarrassed on those occasions when the Chairman happened to be out of town because there was no structure that would maintain the continuity of planning. It is inevitable. I think, that in moments of the Chairman's absence when the responsibility devolves on an Acting Chairman who is a Chief of Service, he devolves on an Acting Chairman who is a Chief of Service, he will turn to his own service staff. Thus, we have a discontinuity that is created with regard to military planning.

Moreover, in each of the crises that I have observed, both within and without the Pentagon, the tendency is strong for each of the services to quite naturally demand a piece of the action as a result of which a service which may have the optimal forces for a particular action will not perform that action. Mr. Chairman, I have over the years seen suggestions that the Coast Guard be transferred to the Department of Defense. I think that is not likely, but if the Coast Guard were transferred to the Department of Defense, I think that the Coast Guard, too, would demand its piece of the action in any crisis that we face. I cite that simply to illustrate the natural tendencies that would exist within the system.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think that the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be a problem during crises because a wise Secretary of Defense will push to one side, gently, if possible, all of those civilian analysts, logisticians, scientists, and engineers who would be field

marshals on those occasions and will return to the professional military who have the expertise to handle the problem. The exception, of course, is international security affairs or at present the Under Secretary for Policy. He must be involved in the process in order to provide the political dimensions to any contest.

I should emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that the military establishment is not particularly sensitive to political dimensions. I can cite some examples from my experience, if you will.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown substantially and has sometimes strayed beyond the appropriate boundaries of its authority. By and large, however, the growth of that office is a reflection of the weaknesses of the military command system.

The Office of the Secretary has provided the analyses cutting across service lines which the Joint Chiefs cannot now provide. It has provided the principal means for reducing military requirements, so-called, to the level of expenditures supported by the national consensus.

Somebody must perform that task. If the Chairman's responsibility, as I suggested earlier, for cross-cutting advice were expanded, the analytical arms of the OSD, the systems analyst's office, whatever it is called now, and the controller's office should be made available to him for his analytical work. This would prevent duplication. Yet, until such time as the uniformed military establishment is better structured to perform these tasks, it seems to me the criticism of the OSD staff must be tempered.

The activities of the OSD have expanded quite naturally. Much of the formulative thinking regarding nuclear strategy and arms control has come from outside of the uniformed military establishment.

It was natural that these matters increasingly were absorbed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but activities did continue to expand. Some were justified—for example, the planning-programing-budgeting system introduced by Secretary McNamara which remains his great monument.

But, without question, the OSD staff has occasionally, though too frequently, become involved with micromanagement within the individual services. That seems to me to exceed the appropriate responsibilities of that staff.

It must be firmly borne in mind, however, that many of the problems of the OSD come from outside. The growth of the staff reflects the enormous increase in the interest and power of outside entities.

There must be continued responses to Members of Congress, to congressional staffs, to the General Accounting Office—all of which have expanded exponentially—as well as to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and to such older institutions with expanded powers like the Department of State and the Office of Management and Budget. If one is concerned about the size as opposed to the role of the OSD staff, the initial place to start is probably outside.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that I have provided sufficient substance for the committee to chew on. I have not gone into the awesome question of roles and missions. a subject fraught with even greater difficulty and one which is perhaps best left alone at this time.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with one final observation.

At the outset, I suggested that structural reform was no panacea, although it could provide for unleashing of imagination and energy within the military establishment, now unduly constrained.

An improved process for decisionmaking is no substitute for trained and ready forces, for high morale, for appropriate logistical support and the like. Nonetheless, an improved structure for decisionmaking will permit, though it cannot guarantee, enhancement of the effectiveness of this Nation's military forces.

In a political democracy, Mr. Chairman, unlike some totalitarian states, we must always be seeking ways of balancing the requirements of our military forces against the requirements of a flourishment civilian sector. I trust, Mr. Chairman, that this committee's deliberations will contribute to the achievement of that goal of a better balance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to take any questions that you or Members of the committee may have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Schlesinger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate this invitation to appear today before the Senate Armed Services Committee to examine the vexing problem of structural reform within the Department of Defense. I can only applaud the Committee's courage in tackling this hoary issue. The task is indeed a formidable one. Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I urge that the Committee not be put off from structural reform because of the formidable institutional obstacles in the path.

All institutions become ingrained and have ascribed to them virtues that in retrospect may appear laughable or even pathetic. Perhaps this is particularly so in the case of military institutions—for which the stakes are so high and the institutions themselves not subjected to severe test during lengthy periods of peace. In this regard, I need only cite the attempts in Great Britain at the close of the 19th century to eliminate the system of commission by purchase. In defense of the purchase system all sorts of economic and political rationals were elaborated, including authoritative support for that hallowed practice by the Duke of Wellington. While the United States has suffered from no such glaring systemic defects as those revealed in the Crimean War, I believe that the experience in recent years does demonstrate that substantial improvements in the performance of the military establishment can be achieved for the Nation's benefit.

I have no wish to exaggerate nor to suggest that structural reform is a panacea that can solve our many military problems. Structural reform is no substitute for capable leadership or for suitable, well-trained and ready forces. Cynics will point out that only a limited amount can be achieved by what is described as "tinkering." Nonetheless, in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the United States will obain neither the best military advice, nor the effective execution of military plans, nor the provision of military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resources provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defense posture available to the Nation.

Since the creation of the modern American military establishment in the aftermath of World War II, we as a nation have been ambivalent regarding the goals that we set for that establishment. We have been and remain ambivalent regarding the purposes of defense unification. We have sought to preserve a degree of Service independence which has precluded effective integration of our military capabilities. I am sure that you are all familiar with the history of the National Security Act of 1947. At the close of World War II, we sought, above all, to avoid the creation of a dominating general staff—reflecting a fear of the German General Staff, that revealed both a misreading of history and a susceptibility to our own wartime propaganda. Whatever the paramount position of Ludendorff in Imperial Germany during World War I, the German General Staff in World War II had little power to control or influence Hitler's regime. Moreover, the issue was quite separate from that of unification, for the German General Staff controlled

only Germany's ground forces. In any event those concerns, whether real or invented, bear little relevance to the conditions of today and bear all the earmarks of another era.

The net effect of the structure that we created in the postwar period was that the balance was tipped toward a preservation of existing institutional interests and against the efficient design of forces or execution of war plans. In the period of America's military pre-eminence, which ended during the decade of the 70's, perhaps such arrangements remained satisfactory, if not wholly suitable. As the overall balance has changed, however, and as the political outcome in a confrontation has become increasingly dependent on the impressiveness of initial performance at the outset of a conflict looking toward rapid termination, we are in my judgment no longer able to bear the luxury of arrangements which, whatever their advantages in preserving traditional institutional roles, militate against the effective execution of military plans.

All of my own experiences within the Department argue in favor of a further integration of the system that would result in a strengthening of both military decisionmaking in this country and the effectiveness of our forces.

The central weakness of the existing system lies in the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You have already heard a great deal of testimony to this effect. Moreover, a series of studies going back for three decades has pointed to this problem. I have no desire to belabor the issue here. Even less do I have a desire to criticize the performance of able men who are performing as well as they can within the constraints of the established system. It is indeed somewhat unfair to criticize a structure which was established on the basis of one criterion—to preserve considerable latitude for the individual Services—on the basis of quite different criteria—to obtain excellent advice, efficient war plans and well designed force structures. The existing structure, if it does not preclude the best military advice, provides a substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such advice. Suffice it to say that the recommendations and the plans of the Chiefs must pass through a screen designed to protect the institutional interests of each of the separate Services. The general rule is that no Service ox may be gored. If on rare occasions disputes do break out that adversely affect the interests of one or more of the Services, the subsequent turmoil within the institution will be such as to make a repetition appear ill-advised.

The unavoidable outcome is a structure in which log-rolling, back-scratching, marriage agreements, and the like flourish. It is important not to rock the boat. This implies a built-in difficulty in formulating and executing military operations. All members of the Congress will recognize the earmarks of the system. It is the way that we formulate national policy. It is the way the Congress is run. The question is whether a system designed for long run political consensus is the appropriate one for making decisions regarding what may be time-urgent military operations. Our political system is designed to force compromise even at the expense of rapid achievement of certain national goals. In the nuclear age, one can only ponder whether a system for forcing compromise in such a manner is appropriate for our military establishment.

Perhaps—though only perhaps—of subsidiary significance is the impact on the formulation of budgets and the design of forces. The existing procedures, regrettably if inevitably, fail to engage with the national process of formulating the defense budget. What comes up from the Chiefs is a mutual endorsement of the individual desires of the several Services. There is no cross-cutting—nor, given the nature of the structure, can there be any cross-cutting. Since I myself have generally been a supporter of the top dollar for the military Services, I believe I can say that the dollar requests are invariably so high that they cannot conceivably be sustained by the national consensus.

The reality of the Nation's defense problem is that we seek to achieve security with an economy of force and an economy of national treasure. Little help can be provided through the existing structure. The proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost always disregarded. The ultimate result is that decisions regarding the level of expenditures and the design of forces are made by civilians outside of the military structure.

Is this an outcome that those who would like to enhance the prestige of the Military Services or the effectiveness of the nation's defenses really want? In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of "unity of command" is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is endorsed, if and only if, it applies at the Service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command.

My greatest concern lies not in the area of budget formulation, however important that may be. It lies rather in the efficient design and execution of military operations. In this area I personally believe that we can no longer accept the burdens of the existing structure.

While I have some hankering after the more radical prescriptions of General Meyer, I would agree with Graham Claytor and others that we are wisest to follow an evolutionary approach. I would move first to fix those things that now need fixing—and avoid the quest for an ideal military command system. In general, therefore, I would support the more modest reforms that have been suggested by General Jones for the strengthening of the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Those reforms are quite similar to ones recently instituted in the United Kingdom.) I believe that the Chairman should be the link to the unified and specified commands, that he should provide independent and cross-cutting advice to the Secretary of Defense, that the Joint Staff should become responsive to his (unilateral) requests, that greater flexibility and continuity should be provided in the Joint Staff, and that there should be a four-star Deputy Chairman.

These are very modest reforms. I think I can assure you that even with such reforms there will remain ample power to preserve the perspectives of the individual Services and protection for their interests. (Indeed, this last point may be the very issue about which General Meyer is concerned.)

Why do I suggest that such reforms are desirable, Mr. Chairman? Because I believe that these reforms would provide for greater coherence and continuity in the planning process and greater effectiveness in execution. Execution in my judgment should be the responsibility of the Chairman- -not of the Joint Chiefs in its present form. The existing structure does impede planning, for each of the Services quite naturally wishes a piece of the action in any crisis—and the existing structure assures that all will somehow be fitted in, even if a Service provides less than optimal forces for dealing with that particular crisis. Coherance would also be enhanced by making the Joint Staff responsive to the Chairman rather than to a five-sided executive.

Continuity is also essential, and would be enhanced by the responsiveness of the Staff to the Chairman and by the provision of a Deputy Chairman. If the Chairman happens to be out of town during a crisis, as was the case in the Mayaguez incident, the acting Chairman, quite naturally, tends to lean on his own service staff. That causes a fair amount of turmoil in the system. The provision of a Deputy Chairman would eliminate that risk. Let me observe in passing, however, that to deal with possible protocol problems that the Deputy Chairman should be ranked sixth in order of precedence—although he would be empowered to act in the Chairman's name in his absence.

Above all, we must seek greater continuity. A less-than-ideal plan, vigorously executed, is better than endless debate.

Mr. Chairman, in so brief a compass I must pass on to other matters and cannot go into further detail. You have raised questions regarding the structuring of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At this juncture I should make one preliminary point. The OSD should not be a problem in crisis management—and, in this regard, may represent something of a red herring. A wise Secretary of Defense will turn for crisis management involving military forces primarily to the uniformed military. That is their professional responsibility. All those civilian engineers, scientists, systems analysts, logisticians and the like, who aspire to be field marshalls, should be gently cut out of the process during the handling of the immediate crisis. The principal exception of course will be International Security Affairs which may play an indispensable role in establishing the political dimensions for the engagement. This last, I might say in passing, is the principal responsibility of the Secretary of Defense—acting in behalf of the President—within the Department. The establishment of political guidelines is of major, potentially crucial, importance. It is not a subject to which the professional military are generally sensitive.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown substantially and has sometimes strayed beyond the appropriate boundaries of its authority. By and large, however, the growth of that Office is a reflection of the weaknesses of the military command system. The Office of the Secretary has provided the analyses cutting across service lines, which the Joint Chiefs cannot now provide. It has provided the principal means for reducing military "requirements" to the levels of expenditures supported by the national consensus. Somebody must perform this task. If the Chairman's responsibility for cross-cutting advice is expanded, the

analytical arms of the OSD should be made available to him. Yet, until such time that the uniformed military establishment is better structured to perform these tasks, criticism of the OSD staff should be tempered.

The activities of the OSD have expanded quite naturally. Much of the formulative thinking regarding nuclear strategy and arms control have come up from outside of the uniformed military establishment. It was natural that these matters increasingly were absorbed within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. But activities continued to expand. Some were justified—for example, the planning-programing-budgeting system introduced by Secretary McNamara, which remains his greatest achievement. But, without question, the OSD staff has occasionally, though too frequently, become involved with micro-management within the individual Services. That seems to me to exceed the appropriate responsibilities of that staff.

It must firmly be borne in mind, however, that many of the problems of the OSD come from outside. The growth of the staff reflects the enormous increase in the interest and power of outside entities. There must be continued responses to members of Congress, to congressional staffs, to the General Accounting Office—all of which have expanded exponentially—as well as to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and to such older institutions with expanded powers like the Department of State and the Office of Management and Budget. If one is concerned about the size of the OSD staff, the initial place to start is probably outside.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that I have provided sufficient substance for the committee to chew on. I have not gone into the awesome question of roles and missions, a subject fraught with even greater difficulty—and one which is perhaps best left alone at this time.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, with one final observation: at the outset, I suggested that structural reform was no panacea, although it could provide for an unleashing of imagination and energy within the military establishment now unduly constrained. An improved process for decisionmaking is not a substitute for trained and ready forces, for high morale, for appropriate logistical support and the like. Nonetheless, an improved structure for decisionmaking will permit, though it cannot guarantee the enhancement of the effectiveness of this Nation's military forces. In a political democracy, Mr. Chairman, unlike some totalitarian states, we must always be seeking ways of balancing the requirements for our military forces against the requirements of a flourishing civilian sector. I trust, Mr. Chairman, that this committee's deliberations will contribute to the achievement of that goal of a better balance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should be delighted to answer any questions that you or other members of the committee may have.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, Dr. Schlesinger, for a very fine statement.

Your commendation to the committee for undertaking this task at the outset of your remarks reminds me of a little slogan we used to recite in the Navy, "If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs, you simply don't understand the situation."

I think there is a great deal we don't understand as we are trying to sort it out here. There is a general agreement that reform is desirable. Our task is to determine what form this reform should take. You skirted this issue.

I would like to see if I can get you to be more specific. In the headquarters of DOD there is no organization that is structured to reflect major defense missions such as defense of NATO Europe, defense of the Persian Gulf, and nuclear defense.

Only at the Unified Command level do we see a major mission orientation. However, unified commands have a limited input in DOD decisionmaking, particularly regarding resource allocations.

By contrast, resource allocations are most heavily influenced by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the organization of the Joint Chiefs, the military departments which are organized along functional lines, logistics, research and engineering, and so forth.

Should we have in Washington at least one organization which approaches issues with a major mission orientation and, to press that further, more specifically to the Joint Chiefs?

Should the Joint Staff be organized along mission lines?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to see that developed. I do not think that it can develop under the present arrangements because the JCS staff will reflect the structure of the services that have the responsibility for the organization, training, logistics, and procurement for the individual services.

I believe the direction that you cite is a desirable one, however. If the Chairman were made more clearly the link to the Unified and Specified Commands, if he acquired greater authority to direct studies without unanimity within the JCS structure, then that staff should be restructured to reflect our major mission areas.

I do not think that it can take place at the present time, but I think it is a desirable goal. Like all these matters, it is a part of the whole and unless one is prepared to transform the underlying premises of the JCS. I do not think that it will take place.

At the moment there is no satisfactory voice within the military establishment for these major mission areas. I think that is correctable, but it will take more than simply a directive to that effect from on high. Over the course of three decades we have had directives from on high that have been disregarded below, and that reflects, I think, the nature of this institution.

Chairman TOWER. Dr. Schlesinger, in your view, does the Office of the Secretary of Defense overemphasize its responsibilities for resource allocation and program decisionmaking to the detriment of its responsibilities for long-range planning and policy direction?

If so, are there organizational changes that could be made to provide for a more appropriate balance between the policy and resource responsibilities?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that, indeed, is the case. The nature of any organization is that routine functions tend to absorb so much time that they drown out the strategic functions.

In part, that will reflect the interests and personality of any particular Secretary. But a Secretary who is interested, who is primarily interested in these larger strategic issues will have to fight for the time within the system that will provide him opportunities for day-to-day functions, for giving speeches and the like.

He will also have to fight a system that exists by edict of previous Secretaries of Defense in which we have a programing cycle and a budget cycle that are separate. The consequence is that something on the order of 8 months of the year are given over to the planning cycle. I think that could probably be cut in half simply by combining programing and budgeting into one review over a 4-month period. That would make it more efficient and more timely.

There is also, of course, the problem of responding to outside requests from OMB, pressures from the White House, pressures from the Congress. All of this tends to make the budget cycle loom larger and larger. Unless the individuals in the OSD fight to preserve time for these strategic issues, that time will slip away.

To summarize, Mr. Chairman, I think that the thrust of your question is quite correct, that we have too little attention paid to these is-

sues in OSD and, for reasons I gave in my earlier testimony, too little attention paid in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is something that should be corrected.

Chairman TOWER. Dr. Schlesinger, apparently 25 senior defense officials report directly to the Secretary. This includes 21 OSD and defense agency officials, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the three service Secretaries.

In your view, does this reporting structure violate the traditional management principles regarding effective span of control?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I can be very brief in my answer, Mr. Chairman. Sure.

Chairman TOWER. In your view, is dual-hatting of service Chiefs an advantage or disadvantage in performing their duties as members of the Joint Chiefs?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think, for the reasons I outlined in my testimony, that that dual-hatting arrangement, combined with the way that the JCS is structured, is a disadvantage. I do not think that it is necessarily a disadvantage. At the present time, each Chief of service must fight for his service's interest or lose the support of his countless followers within the service. Therefore, given the way that recommendations and papers come up from the JCS, it is a formula for frustration. But the dual-hatting itself is a culprit only within that structure.

Mr. Chairman, could I go back to my prior answer which was very brief and perhaps even flippant?

This is a political organization, this is not a business organization. It is true that 20-odd people have nominal access to the Secretary of Defense, but those rights of access in 1984 are more equal in some cases than others.

More and more Assistant Secretaries are added over the years with access to the Secretary. When I was Secretary, I had two Assistant Secretaries that I did not request, who responded to pressures perceived out there in the land coming from various quarters with regard to the treatment of Reserves and treatment of medical problems. We had two additional Assistant Secretaries then. The Congress must discipline itself with regard to adding Assistant Secretaries, but if they are added, they are added for political reasons and they do not interfere with the performance of the system to the extent that one might conclude from looking at a business organization.

Chairman TOWER. I have one final question, Dr. Schlesinger.

You have been Secretary of Energy. Should the organization within the Department of Energy designed to build nuclear weapons be transferred to the Department of Defense?

I might add another question to that. That is, should the Office of Naval Nuclear Reactors be transferred to DOD?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The latter question is perhaps simpler, Mr. Chairman.

The Office of Naval Nuclear Reactors reflected an individual whom the Congress has recently honored once again with a gold medal, Admiral Rickover, who took great advantage of being dual-hatted and using his hat in the Department of Energy or AEC to force decisions in the Navy and vice versa, used his Navy hat to force decisions within the DOE or its Navy predecessor. I think that was a reflection of an

individual personality and perhaps the early circumstances in which there was substantial resistance to nuclear power within the U.S. Navy.

Those circumstances have now changed. I think there are clear advantages in simplifying the structure.

The first issue you dealt with is one that came to my attention when I was Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget. We did a study during the Nixon administration and although the recommendations of the political scientists would have been to transfer that function to the Department of Defense, we decided that it would be an error, first, on the premise "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." The Department of Energy and the Atomic Energy Commission before it handled that particular function with great dollar efficiency.

There is some question—I think that you gentlemen may share in those reservations—whether an equivalent level of efficiency in the performance of that function would be retained if it were moved to the Department of Defense. I do not see the advantages of moving that function since it is working extremely well.

There is a stronger argument for moving the funding over to the Department of Defense and for having the Department pay for the weapons. That would mean that nuclear weapons were traded off against other requirements of the Department rather than being essentially a free good to the Department. I think that deserves further consideration.

At the moment there are many problems in the U.S. Government. One of the least glaring of those problems is the handling of nuclear weapons production, test and evaluation, research and development. So, I would leave that one alone.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.

My time has expired.

Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I regret being late because I think we have before us a witness with considerable experience in this area, and I think all of us value very much getting Dr. Schlesinger's views.

I am trying to catch up on the statement now. I will pose some questions and come back after others have had an opportunity to question.

As I understand it, Secretary Schlesinger, you are more or less endorsing the approach of Dave Jones and Graham Claytor?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. I would like to look at those matters in greater detail, myself, before I give it an unequivocal endorsement, but the general approach sounds correct and I am sure this committee will examine the details before it endorses any particular element.

Senator NUNN. The question I have relates to strategy and the formulation thereof. You have been there and participated, and you have been Secretary of Defense as well as having held numerous other positions in our Government.

When we get to the question of formulating strategy—by that I mean in the broader sense, not a tactical operation like Grenada, but rather the broad strategy that will drive budgetary decisions and priorities in our Armed Forces, and so forth—how does it work now?

Who is responsible for formulating strategy, in the overall government first, and second, in the Department of Defense; and what role does the Joint Chiefs play in the formulation of strategy that should at least theoretically drive budget decisions?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. For reasons that I have indicated, the JCS will be at its best in dealing with operational problems rather than with long-range problems. Part of this reflects the internal workings of the JCS.

As I indicated in my statement, the structure now is such that there are severe penalties imposed by serious cross-cutting efforts within the JCS. Thus, the JSOP and other such documents come up from below with essentially mutual endorsement of the wish list of each of the services. Of course, that wish list is beyond the physical resources supportable by a national consensus.

The services all remember the squabbles between the Army and the Marine Corps back after World War II. We in the outside world may have forgotten those matters. They well recall the fight over the super carrier and the B–36 in the late forties that led to the resignation of Admiral Denfield.

I think at the present time it would be fair to say that there are reservations within the other services about the amount that is being spent on naval task forces by the Navy. There are reservations within the Navy and the other services with regard to, say, the B–1. These issues, given the nature of the system, cannot be addressed.

Senator NUNN. You mean they cannot be addressed by the Chiefs?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Within the Chiefs. Similarly, the long-run strategic designs tend to be an inheritance from the past because a change in concept or a change in strategy is very much of an uphill struggle.

Within the OSD, of course, there is a reflection of the attitudes and personality of the single individual and, therefore, change can come very rapidly; frequently, in my judgment, too rapidly. Institutions do not necessarily flourish under radical change.

For example, in the early 1960's Secretary McNamara supported a counterforce strategy. In or about 1963, he decided suddenly that counterforce was simply unsatisfactory, both, I think, on moral grounds and on budgetary grounds. He reversed himself and embraced the strategy of mutual assured destruction. That was, I think, too rapid a transformation and should have been more argued out before it reflected the changed attitude of a single individual.

But the Office of the Secretary of Defense, unlike the JCS, does provide the opportunity, sometimes misused, of bringing about strategic changes. Only those Secretaries who are interested in these broader problems will bring about this change.

You also mentioned the outside world. I think in the Nixon adminisration that many changes were initiated by Dr. Kissinger who, at that time, was the National Security Adviser before he became Secretary of State. He did not put together the structures to implement the concept that he was pressing upon the Department. The only reason for citing that, however, is to indicate that such changes, in the event that in the White House there sit individuals with clear strategic notions, can come from the outside.

Senator NUNN. Are you saying that the Joint Chiefs as they are now structured and as they now function, really do not participate in a meaningful way in developing a long-range strategy for our military forces?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That is right. I stress, as I did in my statement, that I do not want to criticize any of the individuals in this system. They are able men, but the system constrains them.

For example, to take an area, Senator Nunn, with which you are familiar and have long been interested in, given the nature of the sociology of the Air Force in the fifties and sixties, given the nature of the role of SAC, given SAC's mission and its own interpretation of its mission, it was impossible for the JCS, reflecting the Air Force views at the time, to bring about alterations in strategic doctrine of the sort that we have had recently—by recently, I mean the last decade—because it would have caused too much turmoil with the social structure that is the Air Force and too much turmoil within the JCS.

Those changes had, in a sense, to come from the outside. Various Presidents and Secretaries of Defense have imposed changes in the system. But those kinds of changes have seldom originated within the system at the conceptual level.

In terms of implementation, they are frequently seized upon. For example, General Doherty, whom you well know, seized upon the changes in strategic doctrine of the mid-seventies and implemented them, but they would not have come from within the Air Force or from within the JCS.

It is for that reason that a Chairman or some such individual detached from service sociology and service interest must be available if there is to be major strategic change originating within the military establishment.

Senator NUNN. That is a big "if" at the end. You made it pretty clear, without criticizing any individuals now or in the last few years, that the Joint Chiefs really do not formulate strategy. They do not initiate strategy for our military forces. That has to come from the outside, from the Secretary of Defense, President, NSC, or some combination.

Should we be striving for a mechanism that would permit, perhaps not mandate, but permit, the Joint Chiefs to be an effective mechanism for changing strategy or for altering strategy?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Absolutely, Senator Nunn. I think the vacuum that is created by the frustration with the JCS system has drawn into it, to an undue degree, elements from the outside world, and strengthening the JCS system is the single thing that can best be done to increase the regard, the prestige of the military establishment in this country, and the authority of that establishment.

Senator NUNN. You are saying that they are really rather weak now in terms of making major changes in the direction of the U.S. military strategy or in terms of changes in the budget?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is right. I think they do not influence the budget submitted by the executive branch as much as they should.

I trust that I am telling no tales out of school when I say that the services do have ways of making their views known on Capitol Hill and that, frequently through the back door, they will in the long run achieve their own objectives, particularly with regard to weapons systems. Important areas tend to be neglected. Operations and maintenance, readiness and the like, tend to suffer.

Senator NUNN. If I could just have 1 second. This won't take a minute. I did not mean to use all my time, but I see I have.

You state on page 5, "My greater concern lies not in the area of budget formulation, however important that may be. It lies rather in

the efficient design and execution of military operations." I am using the word "strategy" in our dialog.

Is that synonymous to what you mean by "efficient design and execution of military operations"?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. In that case, I was speaking of more limited operations which require both strategy and tactics. I think, at that level, the strategy frequently will originate with the JCS, but will be afflicted by what I referred to earlier, which is the natural desire of each of the services to feature prominently in any action and to have a piece of the action.

My concern there is that, increasingly in this era in which our nuclear superiority has disappeared, the United States will only be able to maintain deterrence effectively and fulfill its international responsibilities if it is believed to have forces that can perform remarkably well early in an engagement while looking toward a political settlement.

We had, of course, the benefit of a military engagement last year in which American military equipment handled by the Israelis had a shock effect throughout the Middle East and indeed behind the Iron Curtain. But if forces can perform well early on, you have created the circumstances for a political settlement that can protect the interests of the United States and her allies.

It is for that reason that I am most concerned about encumbrances on execution within the existing system. I urged before you came in, Senator, that David Jones' suggestion of a Deputy Chairman be considered favorably by this committee, and the reason is that we lose continuity if the Chairman is ever out of town. That happened during the *Mayaguez* episode. It was not costly in that particular episode, but it did cause undue turmoil. In other circumstances it might have precluded a clearcut win for the United States, and that would have affected the political environment.

I think, in this era, although I am very much concerned about budget, the budget question goes well beyond the question of the JCS structure. It goes into the whole range of the ASPR's, the armed services procurement regulations—the procurement structure of the United States. I think people from industry will tell you informally those regulations result in excessive costs per unit for military equipment. But that cannot be attacked simply within the Pentagon.

At the moment, I think you can resolve the issue of execution by military forces. That is, perhaps, the most worrisome single element because I do not think that we are going to general war with the Soviet Union. I do not think there is likely to be an outbreak of war in the NATO area. But we are going to have engagements of the *Mayaguez* and Grenada sort continuously, and performing well in those contests early on is immensely important in maintaining the prestige of the United States internationally—prestige which is so instrumental in preserving international stability.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, we are glad to have you with us. We highly value your opinion on these matters.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. I have a question on the structure of the Department of Defense. I believe you discussed that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel the military departments are micromanaged by the Office of the Secretary of Defense?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. As I indicated in my statement, Senator, I think there are cases of that, even probably at the present time, although I do not know that for sure. But there have been instances, too frequent instances in the past, of such micromanagement.

But frequently that reflects a desire of the Secretary of Defense and, in that case, the staff cannot be blamed for such micromanagement. It may be a poor idea, but it is not necessarily the staff's idea.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, in your opinion, do the military departments, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, have too strong a voice in the formulation of defense policy or not?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Secretaries of the services, of course, the heads of those military departments have virtually no voice or at least hardly any voice. There are exceptions for a particular individual. Formally, they have no voice in the system.

The Chiefs of services have a sufficient control over the process of recommendations from the JCS that the strength of their position succeeds in the almost total neutralization of the voice of the military establishment. I think that the views of each of these services and the collective views of the military generally could be far more effectively expressed if we had a different structure.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, would you give us your views on the role of the Unified Commanders and your opinion about the possible need for strengthening their position?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that, with regard to the needs of the Unified Commanders, particularly with regard to the readiness of those forces but generally, the views of the CINC's should be strengthened. But there is a problem that we all understand. It is the normal budget problem. If you ask Cincpac, he will deliver the whole United States resources to the Pacific. If you ask Cinclant, he will deliver it all to the Atlantic. There are the usual problems of allocation of resources.

But, at the moment, their voices are too weak. I believe the Chairman of the JCS, who does not represent the individual services, should be strengthened in his role as the spokesman reflecting the views of the CINC's.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, do you feel the defense agencies are too many for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to manage adequately?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. My response will provide you with some suggestion of an answer, Senator Thurmond. I have little judgment on that. That suggestion did not come very close to the attention of the Secretary of Defense in bygone years. I would think, Senator, that you should turn to somebody more expert than I am in these matters.

Senator THURMOND. You have been Secretary of Defense in times past.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Management of those defense agencies, with the exception in my case of the Defense Intelligence Agency, were not sub-

jects that come frequently to the attention of the Secretary. Therefore, I think that you would have to dig down two or three levels in the Department before you get an informed opinion. I do not want to give you a horseback opinion.

Senator THURMOND. If you had the authority to mandate it, by the President or by the Congress, what would you consider the three most important changes that you would make in the Defense Department?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that reflects our earlier discussion, and this is an immediate response, Senators. So, I have not reflected on that at any length.

I would make the set of reforms of the sort—though perhaps not the precise reforms suggested by Gen. David Jones—of the sort which would make the JCS a more effective mechanism. I would include in that what the Chairman talked about earlier, turning the Joint Staff into a more mission-oriented institution, as opposed to a functional institution.

Second, I would create within the Department, with a mixture of OSD staff and military staff primarily from the JCS, but with representation from the services and possibly from the CINC's, an institution that would not be pressed on budgetary or routine matters from anywhere, but could think seriously about strategy on a continuing basis.

Senator NUNN. Where did you say you would put that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I did not say that I would put it anywhere, Senator.

Senator NUNN. I thought I detected some ambiguity.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There was some ambiguity. I think probably it would be under the egis of the Secretary of Defense, but that it might well be chaired by a military officer, perhaps the Chairman, but operating with the authority of the Secretary of Defense. In our system the formulation of strategy should be under a political purview that reflects the wishes of the man who is President of the United States and of the political forces and party he represents. It should not be a free-floating mechanism. Therefore, I put it under the Secretary of Defense.

The third thing I would attempt to do, Senator, is to create more time within the Department. I suggested earlier that the budgeting and programing system be rolled into one and take 4 months instead of 8 months of the year. At the present time, routine functions are squeezing out all the time that might be allocated to considering the longer-term issue, including strategy, that face the Department and face the U.S. Government.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, do you feel authorizations and appropriations should be made over a longer period of time than now or do you think the way we handle it now is preferable?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I would like to see them stretched out as long as possible, Senator, given the views of Members of Congress. I don't believe that any particular Congress can bind a subsequent Congress. Moving to a 2-year appropriation cycle might be both defensible and a substantial improvement. Authorizations, I believe, can go for any period of time and do not necessarily bind a future Congress that would have to appropriate that money. But generally speaking, yes, indeed. The more we can get into longer term commitments the better.

We are run, of course, as you know Senator, by the continued gyrations in our programs. We will have a program manager, who on day one, appears to have $100 million. Then he may look as if he may have $20 million to spend. He has to begin to curtail operations. Then it goes back to $50 million. If we could stabilize these programs, we could substantially reduce costs. To the extent that the Congress arranges for that stabilization funding, it will have contributed substantially to the Nation's defenses.

Senator THURMOND. As I understand it, our position will be for the Congress to appropriate for as long as they have authority, which would be for 2 years?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. That would bind one Congress for 2 years?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Bingaman?

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Schlesinger, it seems like the major thrust of what you are saying is that the organization of the Joint Chiefs is not conducive to pursuing the major mission objectives that we have to or consideration of strategic questions. You have made some recommendations to cure that within the Joint Chiefs.

Do you think similar recommendations are essential in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with regard not to just setting up a group to continually focus on strategy, but perhaps to have an Under Secretary arrangement which is focused more on mission than we presently have?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I am not familiar—sufficiently familiar—with the present arrangements and I do not know what the new Under Secretary for Policy does in this respect. I believe that office does focus much more on mission and less on functions. In your deliberations you may well wish to examine whether or not the role of that office needs further expansion or further concentration on missions within the OSD.

Senator BINGAMAN. This could be outside the scope of these very broad hearings, but let me just ask you.

Your suggestion is that routine matters tend to crowd out consideration of strategic ones and, particularly, budgetary concerns can crowd out considerations of strategic issues.

Are there changes you could recommend in the Congress with regard to our committee system and subcommittee system which would make it more possible for us to focus on strategic issues and less on the routine and budgetary issues. I am talking about with regard to defense.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I thought you were going to ask a different question—whether Congress should do things that would facilitate the saving of time within the Department—and the Congress certainly can.

Senator BINGAMAN. I will ask that question next.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is a matter of self-discipline within the Congress. It is historically the case that the Appropriations Committee have not focused on mission, but have focused on whether or not the United States has paid too much for shoe laces, kegs of nails,

and the like. They have tended to focus on detail. To the extent that the Appropriations Committees can increasingly do their work in the context of mission, that would be beneficial.

It has been the historic function of the Armed Services Committees in the two Houses to concentrate on the broader issues of national policy which I think are the issues which the public would hope that the Congress will deal with. Where are we going as a nation? What are we maintaining our Armed Forces for? To what extent should we have commitments in these parts of the world or that part of the world? If we have those commitments, what, generally speaking, do we need in the way of resources to sustain those commitments. Historically, of course, the Armed Services Committees have done much more, as they should have, in this area than have the Appropriations Committees.

The Budget Committees have moved, I believe, or were tempted to move from their initial function—which was how much can we afford for defense—to getting into details that had primarily been the concern of the Armed Services or the Appropriations Committees. I think that the question for the Budget Committee is very simple. How serious is the threat and how much can we afford to provide for that threat. It does not have to get into questions of whether the B–1 is a satisfactory aircraft or whether or not we should have nuclear-powered carriers or the like.

I do not know that I have been particularly detailed in my response to your question. I am always timid, as one who served in the executive branch, in offering too much free advice to the Congress on its internal structure.

Senator NUNN. You have been less restrained than most.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask that next question.

To the extent you have not already answered it in your testimony, do you see other things that we in the Congress could do to increase the extent to which the Department of Defense focuses on the strategic issues rather than the routine and budgetary issues?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is again, a question of structural discipline within the Congress. As the chairman may recall—Senator Nunn perhaps recalls less acutely—what in the past have been issues that were primarily the responsibility of the Armed Services Committees or the Subcommittee on Military Appropriations have now spread over the entire Hill. Much of the senior staff, including the Secretarial level of the OSD, is responsive to demands from all quarters on Capitol Hill. That means that less and less time is left over for the senior members of the Department to deal with these issues.

I understand why the distribution of authority broke down in the post-Watergate period. I understand that historically. But it has not been functional in terms of helping this government department or any government agency preserve the time of its leadership for dealing with the longer-range issues affecting that department or agency.

There has been a proliferation, of course, of questions. Much invaluable time is devoted to fending off attacks from one quarter or another. I think, in a political democracy, that it is desirable and inevitable that those questions on what is happening within the Department come from Congress. But I would like them to be much more focused than they are at present.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask one other question here.

I do not know the history of this, but I gather that the previous arrangement had a separate deputy for research and development and for acquisition. It is my understanding they are now combined.

Would you comment as to whether you think the arrangement today is operating properly, I mean can one person properly oversee research and development and acquisition or should they need to be separate functions?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think it may be a difficult emotional stretch for some individuals. It is ideal if you can find the right individual. In the past the logistics arm within the services and within the OSD has tended to be dominated by the development arm. That is the historical problem. As a result, we get a lot of ingenuous new equipment going into the field that has as its only defect that it does not work very well. It can't be maintained, it is not reliable, and so on. DDR&E historically has been the proponent of such equipment.

Conceptually, you would want to tie the logistics function into the development function to assure that the equipment that is developed does take into account that this must ultimately be used out there in the field and must work. For that reason, I think that it is desirable to put the two things together.

The problem is that you may still have within a single entity, the same domination of logistics by development because development is fun, ingenuous, stretching the state of the art. Logistics are boring, routine. Its only important asset is that it is indispensable. But mere indispensability does not mean that it will be attended to.

Therefore, if you can get the right man to put these two functions together, it is the best way. If the man does not have that emotional stretch, it has the same danger as the other system.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome back, Dr. Schlesinger. It is always a pleasure to have you before this committee to receive your ideas. I appreciate the contribution you have made to this committee and to the Congress as well.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you.

Senator QUAYLE. On page 5, you talk about the inevitable consequence as both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command.

Then you go on to say the real concern is the efficient design and execution of military operations.

I wonder about this duplication and ambiguity of command you talk about. In looking at the operations, you said in your statement that you do not fear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I hope I did not say that. I say that the probability is very low. I fear it very much.

Senator QUAYLE. The probability will be low, but your more acute attention would be in the quick operations, you mentioned *Mayaguez* and Grenada.

I wonder if you might amplify your concern a bit on the efficient design and execution of the military operation on the *Mayaguez* and also the rescue mission in Iran; and if we are not talking about how

we have this thing structured amplify where each one of the units is all for itself and we get duplication, we get into ambiguity.

Are those instances where we have seen some real problems, particularly the hostage rescue mission in Iran, a mission that failed as soon as we got on the land?

I wonder if this might relate to some of the problems you are talking about?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir, you are right on the mark. Those are the very things that I had in mind. I should stress I am not dealing, however, only with those crises. They are perhaps the most glaring crises. We went on in the Vietnam war for years without ever straightening out our command structure satisfactorily.

In these operations, and others can be added—you have two kinds of problems. I mention the coherence, continuity, and also efficiency. At the present time, each of the services wants a piece of the action and, therefore, those crises responses are coupled together in an atmosphere in which each service is demanding that it have a piece of the action and is demanding usually that it control its own forces.

In the *Mayaguez* case—I don't want to overstate these things—the Air Force was gathering together air policemen in Southeast Asia for an invasion of Kota Island. They were lightly armed and were not equipped to deal with forces in Cambodia.

The Navy, for reasons unclear to me in retrospect, sent a refrigerator ship up there. I don't know whether they were hurling frozen steaks at the Cambodians or what. But that is "a piece of the action."

The greatest problem in the *Mayaguez* case, as I mentioned earlier, is that due to circumstances, the Chairman of the JCS was out of town. When the Chairman is out of town, the responsibility devolves to the Acting Chairman. There is never a complete resolution, in the eyes of all services, of the issue of who the Acting Chairman should actually be. There is a possibility for interservice turmoil under those circumstances. The Acting Chairman, whoever it may be, will naturally lean on those people he knows—that is, his own service staff. The problem will be taken away from the Joint Staff and you will lose continuity. I think that was a major problem in the *Mayaguez* incident.

In the Iranian desert operation—I observed that only from the outside. I suspect, Senator, you can get Admiral Holloway to declassify the study on this, which would probably be more detailed than any comments that I can make—you had the clamor for a mission. In that case we wound up using Navy choppers to operate off the carrier deck that had never been involved in any such mission before. The men who were flying the aircraft were not trained for that kind of mission. We had just emerged from a war in Southeast Asia in which that kind of mission had been repeatedly flown by the Air Force with Air Force choppers, with Army people aboard. Those two services had married together and in addition, those Air Force choppers were air refuelable. That was a major problem, as you recall, in the Iranian operation. For whatever reason within the system, we did not go back and redeem those existing capabilities from the Army and the Air Force for that operation. We did not go back and get the expert knowledge represented by those who had conducted the Sontay operation in 1970 which was, from the standpoint of execution, extremely well conducted.

My observation is that inter-service politics and the desire to have a mission played a substantial role in that. The command structure was never quite satisfied. There were multiple elements of command. This, of course, inevitably reflected the desire of each service to avoid putting its own people under the control of any other service.

Unity of command is indispensable, it seems to me, in such operations. I would say that it is generally indispensable, but if you can have the acme of indispensability, it is in such operations in which decisions must be made very quickly.

You have also, in several of these cases, the introduction of deus ex machina from the political level. As a result, we have built into such things political decision points in which an operation can be reversed. That is, in part, the cost that we bear for our own luxuries—to wit, a worldwide military command and control system.

When Chancelor Schmidt some years ago made the decision to dispatch forces to release that Luftwaffe aircraft down in Mogadishu, he did not have a worldwide command and control system. All he had to do was say to the commander, "You had better win. Go on out there. There are your forces. You get my aircraft and my citizens back." Perhaps he said, "You had better not come back to Germany when it is all over if you fail to do so." But he could not intrude in the process.

We, because we have this worldwide command and control system, permit a bunch of kibitzers, political kibitzers, to intrude throughout, and decision points are built in. With regard to building in of decision points, in the Iranian operation you had built in so many decision points that you had increased the hesitancy of the forces who were charged with the mission. Now, that is something outside the Department of Defense.

Senator QUAYLE. Do you think going along the lines of David Jones' recommendations on restructuring the Joint Chiefs of Staff would help clear up the ambiguities that were obviously there?

I am not talking about political ambiguities. I am talking about the Unified Command and some of the problems you brought out in the Iranian hostage situation and *Mayaguez*.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator QUAYLE. Would it have helped in assisting in getting a clearer picture?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It would have clarified the problem in Washington. Whether it would have added to the success in the field, only circumstances would have told. But it would have eliminated those problems in Washington in which you have the services essentially approving a plan from below and being reluctant to approve if they don't have a piece of the action.

I think that all of those problems can go away. I think the resistance that is made to such suggestions in certain quarters is probably misguided resistance. For example, the Marine Corps, which is an integrated service in itself, frequently hints and more than hints that the responsibility for certain operations should simply be handed over to the Marine Corps. That rarely or never occurs under the existing structure. I think that many of these operations might simply be handed over—lock, stock and barrel—to the Marines if a chairman were in a position in which he had the simple responsibility for execution. He would say, "Go to it, Marines. I am not going to bother

to satisfy the Air Force or the Army or anybody else." At the present time he is under pressure and he is not free to make that decision. Even though the Marines resist moving in this direction, I am not sure that their objectives would not be best served.

Senator QUAYLE [presiding]. Senator Nunn, do you have any more questions?

Senator NUNN. I have a couple of questions.

Let me make a point here and then I will have a couple more questions.

I think our staff, as we look at this organization and as we address the very points that Secretary Schlesinger has brought up this morning, particularly the questions of *Mayaguez*, and so forth, should look at the Grenada operation and look at it in detail.

This was one that we obviously were successful in and we are not out looking for anybody as a scapegoat at all in that situation. Thank God, we were successful.

Yet, I think we have to recognize we had overwhelming military power and we had very weak opposition, although stronger than our intelligence had anticipated.

One question is why didn't we have better intelligence? That has to be answered. I think that is a very important question.

Another question is was it really as efficient as it could have been when, as I understand it, what we really had was the U.S. Marine Corps on one part of the island and Army on the other part; and they actually drew a line dividing the responsibilities. I think that raises questions. Is that really the way you should conduct an operation against a small island?

The other questions that comes to mind pertains to our having had a number of people wounded from our own aircraft. I know some of that is inevitable, and some of that is unavoidable in wartime. I don't suggest those are always avoidable problems, but I do suggest we ought to look at the structure of command and particularly communications, communication between the services, to determine if some of these mishaps could have been avoided by the right command structure.

The other question is, I understand the Marines could not have done this by themselves because they are stretched thin around the world. That is the preliminary information I have. It may have by necessity been a joint operation.

That is another question we ought to ask. Was there a single branch of service that could have done this or was this situation one that had to be done by both the Army and Marine Corps and to some extent by the other services?

The other important question on Grenada I hope our staff would begin looking at—and I would hope we would have it in the next 30 days through interviews because I think it goes directly to this organizational problem—is did we have two separate sets of commanders on the ground? Who was in charge of the ground forces? Did we have one chain of command or did we have two?

Again, preliminarily, my information is that we had two chains of command. Maybe they joined at some point. Certainly they joined at the White House level, but at what point did they join?

I think this Grenada situation could be a very, very important application of some of the things we are dealing with here.

Senator QUAYLE. I certainly agree with that. I would not just limit it to Grenada, though, because I think we can find some structural deficiencies within the command and operation and the ambiguities Dr. Schlesinger is talking about.

I hope we could incorporate them and make comparisons with Grenada, the *Mayaguez* incident and particularly the Iranian hostages, because I think we will find a lot of similarities. Even though you have three different administrations, Ford, Carter, and Reagan, I think from a structural point of view, we ought to look at that in a comprehensive way. I think it would serve the committee well. I think we ought to go back and revisit the Iranian and *Mayaguez* situations because I think you are absolutely right. When we get down to all the talk of structure, design and everything else, it doesn't make much difference. It is how we execute and some of our execution could be faulty.

Senator NUNN. I completely agree. Fortunately we have a very detailed record on the hostage situation. We have a report by Admiral Holloway.

We also had a committee staff that went into great detail on that. We had interviews with all the pilots, most of the pilots. We had interviews with not just the top people, but all the way down the line.

I think we need to do that with Grenada, too, again in the spirit of having a successful military mission, but looking at it from the point of view of what lessons we can learn about structure.

I think we ought to have a detailed process of interviewing. I will bring that up to the Chairman later.

The question I have, Dr. Schlesinger, and this will be my last one——

Dr. SCHLESINGER. May I make a comment on your observations, gentlemen?

Senator NUNN. Certainly.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. You might want to spread your net more widely and add to the staff's work, not excluding a review of command structure for Vietnam, at least in a cursory way.

As you must recall—I think my memory serves me correctly, the B–52 strikes were controlled out of Omaha, SAC strikes. The Air Force was responding to a chain of command going up through the Pacific Air Force, through Cincpac, for its raids on the north. It was allegedly supposedly responding to General Westmoreland and later General Abrams in the south.

The Navy, through a separate chain of command was conducting its own air war in the north. If one wants to look at the problems of unity of command when we are employing multiple services in an engagement, I think that is a subject worth reviewing at the same time.

Senator NUNN. The one question I have is that there is a strong rumor floating around that the Navy and Marine Corps may not agree with Gen. David Jones' formula for restructuring.

Assuming there is some validity to that rumor, would you, Dr. Schlesinger, address the objections that you have heard from the Navy and Marine Corps and tell us which ones you think are valid, and if any come to mind that might not be valid, we would like to hear that. In other words, I would like your evaluation of the opposition because

if we do draft a bill, if we can get together on it, and if we can make it a bipartisan approach, I assume we will have some rather vigorous debate on it and I think your views on that would be valuable.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The Navy has not been an enthusiastic supporter of unification now or in the 1940's. The Navy was reluctant to see the independent Navy Department eliminated and, of course, you will recall during World War II the Navy, under Admiral Cain generally, but in the Pacific, the split between Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, tended to run its own war.

If you accept the Navy view of the world it is by and large that "you ought to give us an assignment and we will do the job. Don't let us be too crowded by these intruders who may have good will but have not been Navy trained and are not as competent as we are." But historically a great deal of surface argument has been superimposed upon that underlying belief, "don't fence me in." Fencing in may be the wrong metaphor for the U.S. Navy, but you get the idea. That is the underlying belief.

You get a great deal of utter tosh about the general staff. We do not want to allow a general staff to dominate civilians. I think that there is some element of disingenuousness in the worry about the civilians. The worry about the general staff is that it will dominate the Navy, not the civilians. Let the civilians fend for themselves.

The general staff issue, I think, is, by and large, a red herring for reasons that I indicated in the paper. If you press people in the Navy on unity of command—they teach unity of command at the Naval Academy, at the U.S. Naval War College, at the National War College, and so forth—or whether they really believe in unity of command, the answer is absolutely so, for the Navy, and if you want to assign additional forces to us under Navy command, that is perfectly fine.

Incidentally, that is probably one of the reasons you will discover that the Grenada operation went as well as it did. The Army and Air Force, if not willing, are less unwilling to place their forces under an admiral that the Navy or Marine Corps is to place forces under the command of an Air Force general or Army general. In the entire world there is only one carrier under the control of a general. That is the carrier in the Mediterranean which through the command system at Naples, goes back to Gen. Bernard Rogers in Brussels. Generally speaking, the Navy is not eager to see naval forces under the command of foreign parties. I think that is the heart of the issue.

If you ask the Navy about unity of command, you get essentially the same answer that you get about centralization. Over the years we have had great argument about centralization and decentralization. People who abhor centralization when they are at lower levels of command love it when they move up the chain of command. The fundamental law for decentralization is "decentralize down to my level. Centralize below that."

The same thing applies to unity of command, "we will have unity of command within my service. But, by God, don't impose it from above."

I think that the Navy attitudes are understandable and deep-seated. But, they run against what the United States requires in this period, which is to make the most of its forces with economy of force from unification.

The Navy has resisted outside help over the years. When I was Secretary of Defense, I pressed and pressed and pressed for Air Force assistance to the Navy under conditions of emergency—for the use of B–52's and other aircraft for surveillance or even for attack purposes.

It turns out that I was getting nowhere. I had discovered there had been a marriage agreement. "You stay out of our medium and we will stay out of yours." We could not get the Air Force to tear up that treaty, or it was difficult to get the Air Force to tear up that treaty. That was the case where you were giving to the Navy additional assets to perform its mission.

The Navy likes to have its forces under its own control. Historically all navies have felt this way.

The attempt of the German Army in the imperial days to acquire control over German naval forces—during the period of the buildup in the 1890's under Von Tirpitz—was fiercely resisted because the feeling was, "here we are a small entity and here is the giant military service, the Army. If you have unification, we are going to be crushed"—the case of getting into bed with an elephant.

All navies have resisted this. It was understandable when the demarcation between sea and land conflicts was more clearcut and when air was not an element. With air as an element, you need to be able to exchange sea-based and land-based air forces more interchangeably. That means unity of command.

I think when you press the Navy on this issue—when you press the point that military officers in all of their institutions are preaching responsible leadership and unity of command. How do you square that with defense of a five-sided executive—the answer is, "We would just feel less comfortable under those circumstances."

You notice, I think, that Admiral Train—after great misgivings in terms of his inculcation in the U.S. Navy—testified in behalf of the Jones' reforms before the House and said that he was having trouble with his old Navy colleagues. If you have been in Admiral Train's position, Cinclant, the need for greater unity is quite clearcut.

When I was Chairman of the AEC, I presided over a five-sided executive, the Atomic Energy Commission. With the support of members of the Commission, with the White House, one was able to nurse out of the five-sided executive some consensus agreement.

But the thing most to bear in mind is the time that it took. There was no command. There was some influence and authority. There was no command. When one is facing a crisis which is time urgent, one does not have the luxury, it seems to me, of permitting a five-sided executive to decide on strategic plans to handle that crisis.

I think if the Navy is pressed, they will come off all of this stuff about the German General Staff. Most of the heads of the German General Staff were removed with considerable rapidity. Some of them were executed by Adolph Hitler.

World War II is not a testimonial to the dominance of the German General Staff. The basic point is that, even with the disadvantages of sacrificing unity of command, which we defend in the abstract, the Navy can perform its mission so much better independently that we are prepared to see that principle violated.

I think that unity of command is indispensable, given the structure of the forces of the United States, given the fact that, in terms of sheer

force structure, the Soviet Union and its allies continue to dominate us in numbers. Therefore, one must achieve the best integration of what we have if we are effectively to indulge in combat and perhaps even if we are effectively to deter.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator QUAYLE. I have just a couple of quick questions on the Joint Staff.

On the Joint Staff, do you believe that these assignments should be permanent or should they be temporary assignments?

My thinking is on a permanent basis they may be more objective and they might not have any fear of retribution once they go back to their individual service, who would say, "You sold me out."

Do you think it should be permanent?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think there must be devised by the Congress and by the Secretary of Defense methods for protection of the careers of those who serve in the Joint Staff. For example, requiring at least as high a percentage and perhaps a higher percentage of promotions of people to particular ranks if they are serving in a Joint Staff capacity. That will encourage the services to send their better people to the Joint Staff.

I would be hesitant to move as far as you suggest, Senator, at this time. I am hesitant partly because of the concern that has long existed that we could create the equivalent of the German General Staff in which one had an elite that was separated from the mass of officers who were out there in the field. The staff officer was dominant.

There is concern. I think if you get Gen. Louis Wilson back up here, he will express this concern. This is the concern of a fighting Marine—we are getting too many people who earn their promotions through the staff system and too few who are actually able to lead troops in the field—have capability of this combat leadership. That is a concern you should very carefully examine.

At this time, all I think is necessary is greater flexibility in the system. The House passed legislation to extend the term of service on the Joint Staff from 3 to 4 years. It allows flexibility for the Chairman, with the permission of the Secretary of Defense, to extend beyond the 4 years for individuals.

We can reform by evolution. I think that if the Congress makes it clear that it believes in the jointness of the military establishment and it demands that the services respect that, you will get almost as much improvement as you can get by any other means—without having the risk of establishing an elite through a permanent staff.

Senator QUAYLE. Who best can make the determinations of length of service of the Joint Staff? Should it come from individual services or should you put more authority in the hands of the Chairman or election process?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I would change that now. In that respect I don't remember precisely—I think the House legislation goes in the right direction, that the Chairman should have considerable authority, that he can tell the services how large a list he wants of available officers. For example, if you have 30 places and you get a list of 31 candidates, you are not allowing much latitude, you are imposing your own choices.

I think that at the present time the Joint Staff gets some very good officers. But, at the moment, the services or some of the services do hold back their very best officers from those joint assignments.

Senator QUAYLE. Why is that?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think there are a variety of motives. If they are very good, if they are comers, you don't want to waste them on an assignment that the service considers less good.

If you have a structure such as the JCS in which you have four or five rights of quasi-veto in the system, you don't have to have your best officer over there to say, "Well, we are not going along with this plan unless you increase your recommendation for weapon system *X*."

That is a very simple message. You can have an ambassador who is not your optimum man. The service will have the feeling that they may want to retain the very best people. This varies by the service.

Historically, for example, the Army has been much more willing to provide its best people for these kinds of joint functions. The Army historically has been joint minded, as it were much more so than the Navy. That comes out of World War II and before.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you.

I always find you a most interesting witness. We appreciate your time.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator QUAYLE. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

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